On this day in history, the Japanese government surrendered to the Allies, ending World War II. And while there’s much to be said about the event, ideally by someone who has something of interest to say (Silbey? Are you out there somewhere?), I found this snippet from the Times‘s coverage interesting:
The President’s final announcement was to decree holidays tomorrow and Thursday for all Federal workers, who, he said, were the “hardest working and perhaps the least appreciated” by the public of all who had helped to wage the war.
We’ve been involved in either one or two wars for what, six years now? And it’s hard to imagine President Obama singling out federal employees, other than those in the armed forces, for their efforts during this time of crisis. And yes, I know, WWII made very different demands on the country. But still, things have changed, right? Although, perhaps not in every way, as the Times article also goes out of its way to call the nation’s capital dull: “usually bored Washington”. Heh.
Oh, then there was this alarming passage, which also brought me up short:
If the note had not come today the President was ready though reluctant to give the order that would have spread throughout Japan the hideous death and destruction that are the toll of the atomic bomb.
What catches my eye there is the implied menace: that Truman stood ready to drop more atomic bombs on Japanese cities (I presume) had he not received the note of surrender on this day in 1945. Was the author just being dramatic? Was he serving as a propaganda arm of the U.S. government, laying the groundwork for years of Cold War bluster? Or was that generally understood as the situation at the time?
27 comments
August 14, 2009 at 11:53 am
Jason B.
Well, it doesn’t preclude the possibility that he would have been “ready but reluctant” tomorrow if the note hadn’t come on that day, but you’re right. That statement has a finger-on-the-trigger feel.
August 14, 2009 at 11:57 am
JRoth
I don’t think I’ve ever read anything suggesting that this date was the definitive one (setting aside the facts that I’m 95% certain the US had no bombs ready to drop on the 14th).
That said, I think that the US had been implying pretty strongly to Japan that the “pause” after Nagasaki wouldn’t last forever. Maybe this was just the logical afterword of that threat?
August 14, 2009 at 12:04 pm
JRoth
I think we all agree that Truman was being kind of a dick to overlook the hard work by and lack of appreciation for history professors, btw.
August 14, 2009 at 12:07 pm
ari
I guess that’s right, JRoth. It’s just that the article seems to say that this was the day — or else. And I wonder where that came from.
As for history professors, the nation would crumble without them. [/disinterested observation]
August 14, 2009 at 12:21 pm
TF Smith
From a historiographic sense, what’s the general level of opinion among academcs today about the work of Kent Roberts Greenfield (editor of the Army’s “Green Books” series), SE Morison (United States Naval Operations in WW II), Craven & Cate (USAAF), and the rest of the “official” historians?
Much less those (speaking of unsung civilians) who wrote the histories of the WPB, OWM, the works that include The United States at War: Development and Administration of the War Program (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Budget, 1946) and Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies (Washington, D.C.: Civilian Production Administration, 1947)?
August 14, 2009 at 12:23 pm
Ahistoricality
Did we have any more bombs at that point? My recollection is that we had no working bombs left after Nagasaki, but would have more soon.
Hmm… Wikipedia, citing primary sources says that “The United States expected to have another atomic bomb ready for use in the third week of August, with three more in September and a further three in October.” About one bomb every ten days, then: imagine fighting the war like that?
August 14, 2009 at 12:49 pm
TF Smith
L-day for OLYMPIC (Kyushu) was set for Nov. 1, IIRC; CORONET (Honshu) was planned to begin March 1, 1946…both, in turn, would have been the largest amphibious operations in history, with more troops afloat than Normandy, Okinawa, Lingayen Gulf, or Leyte Gulf.
August 14, 2009 at 1:06 pm
soup biscuit
I guess that’s right, JRoth. It’s just that the article seems to say that this was the day — or else. And I wonder where that came from.
Also, didn’t he have at least a variant of the same note a couple of weeks before the bombings (which was rejected at the time)? I can easily imagine this sort of bluster was really not aimed at Japan, by then.
August 14, 2009 at 1:53 pm
Charlieford
I thought they weren’t going to have more bombs ready to drop for several months, and that there was a plan (of course, what’s that mean?) to use them in the fall if Japan hadn’t surrendered. I’d be interested if the story deals at all with the negotiations over the emperor, or touches on the notion that this was at best a pretty ambiguous “unconditional” surrender.
August 14, 2009 at 2:03 pm
ari
I thought they weren’t going to have more bombs ready to drop for several months, and that there was a plan (of course, what’s that mean?) to use them in the fall if Japan hadn’t surrendered.
This has always been my impression as well.
August 14, 2009 at 2:27 pm
TF Smith
According to this source, the “third shot” would have been Tokyo on Aug. 19, 1945…
http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8237.html
August 14, 2009 at 2:32 pm
TF Smith
Another excerpt from the same source:
http://books.google.com/books?id=N7eq7AgZKokC&pg=PA11&lpg=PA11&dq=third+combat+drop+of+atomic+bomb&source=bl&ots=Wj-IJIoQpX&sig=-3o1JRyvZC5RZ3SBn_Nt0Z3KFX0&hl=en&ei=QNaFSruUIqGStgeX893nDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2#v=onepage&q=&f=false
gives:
Aug. 19 (2nd plutonium implosion bomb, the “Fat Man” design);
September – “possibly 3” more weapons
to “seven or more” additional weapons by December.
August 14, 2009 at 2:43 pm
TF Smith
A memo:
Click to access 72.pdf
Gordin’s book proposal is available on-line, as well.
August 14, 2009 at 2:47 pm
TF Smith
Take a look at the H-Diplo roundtable involving Gordin, Hasegawa, and Alperovitz, among others – very interesting discussion:
H-Diplo Roundtable- Racing the Enemy Roundtable, Gordin on Hasegawa
August 14, 2009 at 3:03 pm
silbey
Green books have a good reputation; Morison less so.
(Busy week, else I would have posted something; thanks, ari)
August 14, 2009 at 5:45 pm
PorJ
Much less those (speaking of unsung civilians) who wrote the histories of the WPB, OWM, the works that include The United States at War: Development and Administration of the War Program (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Budget, 1946) and Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies (Washington, D.C.: Civilian Production Administration, 1947)
Wasn’t there an official Historians group within the OWI – before Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. resigned and took them all with him? Assembled by Pringle? I have a vague recollection of this – a group of historians working for the government to pop out progressive propaganda on things like racial equality – and running into trouble with Southern legislators. They all left because of censorship in 1943 or 1944, I think.
Historians *were* doing their duty (at least up to a point).
August 14, 2009 at 6:04 pm
TF Smith
To be fair, Greenfield’s charge and Morison’s were very different; the closest naval equivalent to the Green Books are the Administrative Histories, and even they were a different type of work.
Dunno about Schlesinger et al.;
August 15, 2009 at 8:58 am
silbey
To be fair, Greenfield’s charge and Morison’s were very different
That’s not why Morison’s reputation is worse.
August 15, 2009 at 4:57 pm
jim
If they’d had a third bomb available, it would have been dropped on the 12th.
I don’t know how seriously to take the claim that the third shot would have been Tokyo on August 19th. The original target list had been Hiroshima, Kokagura, Nagasaki and Niigata. I don’t know of any order superseding this list. The memo that T F Smith cites at 2:43 suggests that Marshall wanted to revisit the original target list, but doesn’t establish that anyone actually did.
August 15, 2009 at 11:33 pm
TF Smith
Gordin says “Discussion of target and timing for the Third Shot—most likely Tokyo on 19 August— proceeded actively both before and after Nagasaki.” on page 11; I think he addressed his thinking on the H Diplo discussions of Hasegawa’s work, as well.
What is the criticism of Morison’s work based on?
August 16, 2009 at 2:09 am
Doug M.
I have trouble seeing the point of a strike on Tokyo. One, pretty much everything of military value (and a great deal else) had already been destroyed by earlier bombings and the March firestorm. Two, it wouldn’t make a lot of sense to kill the leadership, since they were the guys who could surrender.
This is exactly why Tokyo was not on the original list of four cities. As noted upthread, these were Hiroshima, Kokura, Nagasaki and Niigata. Bock’s Car went to Kokura first, but couldn’t acquire the target due to smoke and weather conditions, and so went to Nagasaki instead.
I can’t see why the planners would suddenly add Tokyo to the list. A fair amount of planning and thought had gone into it, after all. You’d reasonably expect the next city to be either Kokura or Niigata.
(N.B., all the cities on the list had some military utility; Kokura was the home of the Kokura Arsenal, which in August ’45 was still producing bombs, shells and rifles.)
Doug M.
August 16, 2009 at 2:14 am
Doug M.
Memo on target selection:
http://www.dannen.com/decision/targets.html
Kyoto and Yokohama were on the longer list, but Tokyo was not.
Doug M.
August 16, 2009 at 5:56 am
silbey
What is the criticism of Morison’s work based on?
His tendency to not credit the work of others as much as he might and his habit of treating certain people badly (Fletcher, for example).
August 16, 2009 at 11:37 am
Anderson
His tendency to not credit the work of others as much as he might
Well, that puts Churchill’s plagiarisms of Morison in a new light; perhaps that’s one reason why Morison was relatively relaxed about the matter.
August 16, 2009 at 7:51 pm
TF Smith
Regards to Tokyo becoming a target, someone could ask Gordin, I expect; he’s not hard to fin.
On the Morison criticism, what does the “not credit the work of others” comment speak to? His acknowledgements are pretty thorough as to the contributors, and their are a couple of elements I can think of where the authors are fully credited as such – the chapter in Vol. I by Dudley Knox, for example.
As far as the “treatment” of Fletcher goes, given that Roosevelt, Knox, King, and Nimitz were all content to have Fletcher in Seattle in the winter 1942-43 and only moved him to the North Pacific command after LANDCRAB and COTTAGE were over, it seems FJF’s superiors were in agreement about his capabilities, whether Fletcher’s more recent biographers agree with them or not…
August 17, 2009 at 1:33 am
ajay
About one bomb every ten days, then: imagine fighting the war like that?
That’s one option, but I suspect that the planners would have wanted to build up a stockpile for use to support Olympic.
August 17, 2009 at 6:10 am
silbey
On the Morison criticism, what does the “not credit the work of others” comment speak to?
Morison seems to have taken fully-researched and written work by his contributors and rewritten in his own (estimable) prose style. “Acknowledging” them in that instance seems much too little.
As far as the “treatment” of Fletcher goes, given that Roosevelt, Knox, King, and Nimitz were all content to have Fletcher in Seattle in the winter 1942-43
Morison’s job was not to endorse those actions, but to examine them.