Speaking of cowboy culture, here’s a chart of the murder rate in the US for most of the twentieth century.1
Douglas Eckberg presents the revised series because the early Census data under-reported homicides and didn’t cover the whole US; Eckberg’s estimates probably provide a more accurate picture of the murderous early c20.
The numbers indicate something long remarked on but little explained. Here’s Richard Hofstadter in his introduction to American Violence:
For the long span from about 1938 to the mid-1960’s, despite the external violence of World War II and the Korean War, the internal life of the country was unusually free of violent episodes. Industrial violence and lynching had almost disappeared. Rioting in the cities—despite the Harlem riot of 1935, the Detroit riot of 1943, and the Los Angeles zoot-suit riot of the same year—occurred less often than in many past periods. Americans who came of age during and after the 1930’s found it easy to forget how violent a people their forebears had been.
Later in the chapter, Hofstadter speculates as to why the US has a history of violence but little memory of it:
… one is impressed that most American violence—and this also illuminates its relationship to state power—has been initiated with a “conservative” bias. It has been unleashed against abolitionists, Catholics, radicals, workers and labor organizers, Negroes, Orientals, and other ethnic or racial or ideological minorities, and has been used ostensibly to protect the American, the Southern, the white Protestant, or simply the established middle-class way of life and morals. A high proportion of our violent actions has thus come from the top dogs or the middle dogs. Such has been the character of most mob and vigilante movements. This may help to explain why so little of it has been used against state authority, and why in turn it has been so easily and indulgently forgotten. Our new concern about violence today is, among other things, a response to a sharp increase in its volume, but it is also a response to its shifting role. Violence has now become, to a degree unprecedented in the United States, the outgrowth of forcible acts by dissidents and radicals who are expressing hostility to middle-class ways and to established power.
Hofstadter was writing in 1970, when he observed and worried about increased enthusiasm for violence on the left. I do not think this lasted much longer than 1970, yet the murder rate stayed pretty high afterward.
1From Historical Statistics of the US, series Ec190-191.
16 comments
August 3, 2009 at 4:57 pm
Kieran
the internal life of the country was unusually free of violent episodes
Only by its own standards, which of course shouldn’t be discounted. But here’s the comparative context if you’re interested.
August 3, 2009 at 4:59 pm
eric
You know, I’m glad you pointed that out, Kieran. Looking at the homicide rate graph, it occurred to me it looks a lot like the Gini coefficient graph for the same period. And I wondered: how do Gini coefficients and homicide rates compare across countries?
August 3, 2009 at 5:17 pm
Kieran
Hm, the OECD Gini series should be easy to get.
August 3, 2009 at 6:01 pm
Ben Alpers
Hofstadter was writing in 1970, when he observed and worried about increased enthusiasm for violence on the left. I do not think this lasted much longer than 1970, yet the murder rate stayed pretty high afterward.
Was the far left’s brief flirtation with revolutionary violence ever statistically significant enough to affect the national murder rate? One of the many failures of Weatherman is that they were always a vanguard in search of a movement. They predicted 25,000 people showing up in Chicago for the Days of Rage in 1969, and they got a couple hundred.
August 3, 2009 at 7:23 pm
AWC
I agree Ben. I have to assume RH was including the Long Hot Summers, though even they wouldn’t have made a statistical dent in the national murder rate.
August 3, 2009 at 7:27 pm
Mike
Some random thoughts: Dyskstra, I think, would argue that “cowboy culture” doesn’t really explain much when it comes to either rates of murder or “violence,” which are related, but not quite the same thing.
In a different vein, Hofstadter was surely correct in arguing that before WWII, collective violence largely consisted of the majority imposing its will on a minority, but I’ve often wondered to what extent this was a function of nascent democracy. To put this another way, Hofstadter (and many others before and since) viewed collective violence as aberrant behavior that cut against the democratic impulse and the rule of law. But given the sheer number of riots during the 19th century alone, it’s not unreasonable to conclude that rioting was widely considered a legitimate adjunct to the democratic process. So, to what extent was American violence before the 20th century simply an outgrowth of democratic culture?
On yet another note, Eric Monkkonen, who did a lot of work on this subject, used to wonder whether 19th-century murder rates were artificially low given the primitive state of criminal investigation. How many drownings, he used to ask, were actually murders, in an era when many could not swim? Was the rate in 1900 really so low?
Lastly, much as I love reading Hofstadter, and he was a wonderful writer, his work was…impressionistic. Did he ever use a chart like this one?
August 3, 2009 at 9:51 pm
serofriend
Violence, like gender, is a tricky category of analysis. I’m more familiar with it in an early American context, ethnohistory, and Hofstadter. I wonder if, like gender-sex, scholars should distinguish between socio-cultural violence and physical violence. I’ve faced difficulties with analysis using the former, mostly because the latter serves as requisite causation. For instance, violence fueled the cultural systems of sedentary cliff-dwelling communities such as Chaco Canyon and Mesa Verde. Likewise, migratory bands participated in Spanish military endeavors during the post-contact period and seemed to have experience with violence in ritual and war. So to what degree did violence (physical) cause landscape, marine space, and cultural violence?
Images of violence between various tribes and “colonists” also contributed to the formation of authenticity paradigms in each. Even an image of French-Algonquian soldiers-warriors against Iroquois sauvages reinforces these ideas. Just ruminating.
August 3, 2009 at 11:05 pm
fromlaurelstreet
It’s interesting how these numbers coincide with the rise and fall of polarity of the two political parties.
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2009_08/019323.php
August 4, 2009 at 7:13 am
Chris
I assume that the homicide rates for the war years don’t include the war itself? If we stopped killing each other because we were busy killing Germans, that seems like a dubious improvement, and one that doesn’t scale well.
I would be inclined to credit the postwar prosperity if not for the fact that the drop seems to start *before* the war, possibly around the time the New Deal started taking effect.
It’s common knowledge that people with no legal job may resort to property crime and/or black marketeering to support themselves. How much murder is linked to these other crimes, e.g. through gangster activity? If the New Deal shrank the pool of potential criminals, what effect would that have on murder?
Desperate people may also be more likely to join groups like the KKK (which obviously tends to increase the murder rate), and/or respond violently to quarrels that people in better circumstances would have resolved nonviolently.
August 4, 2009 at 7:19 am
Hogan
the drop seems to start *before* the war, possibly around the time the New Deal started taking effect.
Also around the time Prohibition was repealed.
August 4, 2009 at 9:35 am
rea
Also around the time Prohibition was repealed.
And then the numbers start to go back up with the beginning of the drug wars . . .
August 4, 2009 at 2:21 pm
Chris
Well, that would certainly have an impact on the number of people engaging in black-market and other organized crime activities.
It’s stereotypical that people who are competing to sell illegal products murder each other a lot, but is that actually a significant component of the overall murder rate (compared to people with little or no criminal background killing for inheritance, insurance, jealousy, as an alternative to divorce, as an escalation of ordinary arguments or fistfights, etc.)? Do the changes in overall rate correspond mainly to a particular category of murders (by motive? by demographic of killers or victims?)?
August 4, 2009 at 3:27 pm
seriofriend
I wonder if economic downturns correlate with the graph as well.
August 5, 2009 at 1:34 pm
sharon
There are a lot of comparative European stats in this article:
Manuel Eisner, ‘Modernization, Self-Control and Lethal Violence. The Long-term Dynamics of European Homicide Rates in Theoretical Perspective’, British Journal of Criminology 41 (2001), 618-638.
IIRC (it’s been a while since I read it), European countries generally did have some upturn in homicide rates after the middle of the 20th century, after long periods of decline (exact timings vary from place to place), but nothing like the rise in the graph above.
August 16, 2009 at 7:14 am
buzz
It’s illegal drug and alcohol money that sparks the rise in violent crime. The greater the punishment, the higher the risk, the greater the reward. Murders begin rising in the mid-1910s as more and more states go dry, really shoot up as Prohibition sets in, then briefly spike in the aftermath of Prohibition’s repeal as various organized gangs nove into new areas of operation before dropping dramatically. Also, murders spiked briefly in 1945 because a lot of service men were returning home (it probably wasn’t combat vets committing the crimes but support and rear echelon troops who had not really been exposed to the horror of war). The rise in murder starts again in the late 1950s as drug enforcement steps up and really hits high numbers in the coke fueled 1970s and 90s.
August 17, 2009 at 5:10 am
Seth Rogaine
Perhaps people (men, mostly) didn’t kill as much during the Depression because they were…depressed? Homicide is driven by ego, and if you barely feel you have a right to exist, as many ex-breadwinners felt in the ’30s, you might be less likely to murder or to escalate a fight into a matter of Webbian ‘honour’.
In this sense, Hofstadter’s fear of the violence of the marginalised seems justified—once you believe you have rights….