Because a number of people have asked, and the relevant section—the start of the letter—doesn’t seem to be on the Internets elsewhere, I provide here the opening of Keynes’s letter to Roosevelt, with some interpolation/translation and historical detail.
… the present recession
—by which he means, the downturn of late 1937-1938, not the Depression—
is partly due to an ‘error of optimism’ which led to an overestimation of future demand, when orders were being placed in the first half of this year. If this were all, there would not be too much to worry about. It would only need time to effect a readjustment….
But I am quite sure that this is not all. There is a much more troublesome underlying influence. The recovery was mainly due to the following factors:—(i) the solution of the credit and insolvency problems, and the establishment of easy short-term money;
(ii) the creation of an adequate system of relief for the unemployed;
(iii) public works and other investments aided by Government funds or guarantees;
(iv) investment in the instrumental goods required to supply the increased demand for consumption goods;
(v) the momentum of the recovery thus initiated.Now of these (i) was a prior condition of recovery, since it is no use creating a demand for credit, if there is no supply.
This is the start of what teachers call the “praise sandwich”—we’ll say something nice, before we explain why you get a D. So let’s begin: good for you, Mr. President: the bank holiday, revaluing and stabilizing the currency, deposit insurance, recapitalizing the banks with the RFC—all that was swell.
But an increased supply will not by itself create an adequate demand.
For example, notice how people still aren’t borrowing from banks, which still aren’t lending? That means you still have work to do.
The influence of (ii) evaporates as unemployment improves, so that there is a dead point beyond which this factor cannot carry the economic system.
Good for you too, for not letting people starve: but relief is not recovery.
Recourse to (iii) has been greatly curtailed in the past year.
I use the passive voice here to spare your feelings, but why oh why did you cut back on the WPA and the PWA, seeking a balanced budget, when the recovery had barely begun?
(iv) and (v) are functions of the forward movement and cease—indeed (v) is reversed—as soon as the position fails to improve further.
You see, the flywheel of government spending had only just barely engaged the gears of the economy when you timidly pushed the clutch back in, so of course you started immediately to slow down.
The benefit from the momentum of recovery as such is at the same time the most important and the most dangerous factor in the upward movement. It requires for its continuance, not merely the maintenance of recovery, but always further recovery. Thus it always flatters the early stages and steps from under just when support is most needed.
You need the government to spend more to get over that initial inertia and let the economy begin to run smoothly of its own accord.
It was largely, I think, a failure to allow for this which caused the ‘error of optimism’ last year.
Unless, therefore, the above factors were supplemented by others in due course, the present slump could have been predicted with absolute certainty.
I’m trying very politely not to say that a monkey could have told you not to cut back on government spending at just that moment. “Have you perhaps a monkey to advise you?” is the kind of thing I am avoiding saying.
It is true that the existing policies will prevent the slump from proceeding to such a disastrous degree as last time.
Congratulations, you have not made quite such a mess of things as Herbert “almost twenty-five percent unemployment!” Hoover. Yet.
But they will not by themselves—at any rate, not without a large-scale recourse to (iii)—
Remember (iii)? (iii) was “public works and other investments aided by Government funds or guarantees”. You need more of that. On a large scale. Otherwise, “error of optimism” –> catastrophe.
—maintain prosperity at a reasonable level.
The letter goes on at some length to make further recommendations, and toward the end gets on to being nice to FDR again, letting him know that he can lead the markets with the often-quoted comparison of businessmen to “domestic animals by nature, even though they have been badly brought up and not trained as you would wish.”
John Maynard Keynes to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 2/1/1938. “Activities 1931-1939,” vol. XXI of The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (Cambridge, Eng.: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 434-439.
17 comments
November 20, 2008 at 7:06 pm
Matt Weiner
what teachers call the “praise sandwich”
You don’t name the sandwich after what’s on the outside — what I’ve always heard is “shit sandwich.”
November 20, 2008 at 7:50 pm
grackle
Keynes? Keynes? Don’t bother me with Keynes, I’m still stuck trying to figure out Leibniz, the PSR and the PC. It might be beyond me.
November 20, 2008 at 11:21 pm
A picture worth a thousand of Keynes’s (and my) words. « The Edge of the American West
[…] 20, 2008 in history and current events, new deal denialist truth squadding | by eric Maybe Keynes’s letter, with my interjections, proved too much for you: Michael Cembalest, Chief Investment Officer of J.P. Morgan, sends out […]
November 21, 2008 at 3:28 am
andrew
I think I’ve worked it out. Keynes had a commitment to the idea that:
1. All government actions play by the same rules.
2. “Public works and other investments aided by Government funds or guarantees” help the economy recover according to the Principle of Sufficient Stimulus.
Anti-New Dealers saw that a) the 1938 recession followed a cutback in government spending as described in (2) above, and b) an increase in government spending during the second world war brought the economy out of the depression. The implications of these observations led them to worry that they might be heading into Keynesianism.
Eventually, they came up with the Principle of War Spending, which states that
Another way to phrase this would be to say that the reason war spending helped the economy is because.
The Principle of War Spending and the Principle of Sufficient Stimulus are both independent fundamental principles. Therefore, neither principle can follow from the other – one cannot say, for instance, that war spending is a form of stimulus and then conclude that war spending helped the economy recover by the Principle of Sufficient Stimulus (rather than by brute necessity) – and neither can contradict the other.
But because it was war spending, not stimulus spending that ultimately got the country out of the depression, the existence of the PWS forces a reconsideration of the PSS: maybe no stimulus spending would have been sufficient. Furthermore, this also implies that not all government actions play by the same rules.
November 21, 2008 at 7:43 am
grackle
I’m in awe. Leibniz and Keynes. Thanks, Andrew.
November 21, 2008 at 7:54 am
dana
Wow. I must find a hat so that I might tip it.
November 21, 2008 at 7:56 am
dana
You don’t name the sandwich after what’s on the outside — what I’ve always heard is “shit sandwich.”
It’s really bad when it’s an open-faced shit sandwich.
November 21, 2008 at 8:13 am
You got your chocolate in my peanut butter (this time, without breaking the blog.) « The Edge of the American West
[…] 21, 2008 in history and current events | by dana Promoted from comments by the Principle of Sufficient Awesomeness, by the most excellent andrew: I think I’ve worked it […]
November 22, 2008 at 6:12 pm
Sandwichman
Can you take a break from truth-squadding the right for a moment and do some t-s on the following (from Benjamin Hunnicutt’s Work Without End) especially in light of Keynes’s memorandum of 1943 specifying “working less” as one of three ingredients for a cure of unemployment — and the “ultimate” one at that?
“In a letter to Arthur Schlesinger dated April 9, 1958, Leon Keyserling stressed that Roosevelt came to Washington without a “systematic economic program.” The “highly experimental, improvised and inconsistent” programs of the first New Deal defy categorization. They were the products of “schools of reformers” that had been promoting diverse programs that Roosevelt, higgledy-piggledy, picked up. According to Keyserling, the PWA, CWA, NIRA, and the rest were not parts of any systematic plan or overall purpose. The only coherence given these events came from outside the administration. It was the “desire to get rid of the Black bill” that prompted the administration to draw up such things as the NRA, “to put in something to satisfy labor.” This same point was made by other notables in Roosevelt’s administration, among them Raymond Moley.
“Throughout the depression, 30-hour legislation goaded Roosevelt to action. The Black-Connery bill, introduced in each depression Congress until passed in highly modified form as the Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA] in 1938, with all the work-sharing teeth pulled, continued to function as a sort of reverse polestar, enabling Roosevelt to chart his course by the simple expedient of sailing in the opposite direction. Roosevelt’s instinctive reaction against 30 hours matured to positive approaches to industrial stabilization and reemployment. They were built on work creation, not work spreading, founded on industrial growth and increased spending as the wellsprings of progress. In the process, he and his administration discarded the century-old notion that work reduction had the potential for social and individual advancement.
From the point of view of someone like Representative William Connery, who pushed for 30 hours from 1932 to 1937, the New Deal had a coherence, a reason for happening when and as it did, that was lost on others not so positioned. From Connery’s perspective, the New Deal was what it was because of its opposition to 30 hours.” — Hunnicutt, pp.248-49
November 23, 2008 at 11:33 am
With Tyler against the strawmen and conservatives. « The Edge of the American West
[…] As Tyler points out, and as you’ve read here, “New Deal fiscal policy didn’t do much to promote recovery.” Just so: which is what […]
November 23, 2008 at 5:22 pm
Hemlock
Not really my field, but: Perhaps expand beyond the discursive confines of “war spending” and just dub the first principle “necessary spending.” Although I suppose that the former is specific to contextualizing Keynesianism and the “end of reform.” Need to be consistent: “not all government actions play by the same rules.”
In any case, sufficient stimulus and necessary government spending are independent principles. The latter facilitated recovery much more quickly and effectively than the former (that graph contributes to this conclusion). Perhaps because the majority of consumers (no longer?) interpret U.S. interventionist policies in the Middle East and elsewhere as “necessary” or “wartime,” the government must rely on PSS in the form of a New New Deal…which, again, proved less effective in a short time span. Hence pundit comparisons between the supposed “New Deal” recovery (not actual policies)–conflating wartime with the 1930s–is not a very good fit.
November 23, 2008 at 5:34 pm
Hemlock
…all this in the context of massive government spending during WWII. So consumers as well as the historcal context of “war” are important.
November 24, 2008 at 5:12 am
D S Lamont
If you want to put Keynes’s views in context, it would be a good idea to read either Donald Moggridge’s “Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography” (1992) or Donald Markwell’s “John Maynard Keynes and International Relations” (2006). If you want sex with that, read Skidelsky, and if you want a blemish-free Keynes, try Roy Harrod. But it would be really good if more of the commentary on Keynes actually took account of his context…
November 24, 2008 at 7:04 am
eric
I’ve read Skidelsky and profited by it. How do you think it should have changed this post?
November 24, 2008 at 12:29 pm
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November 27, 2008 at 9:31 am
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December 9, 2008 at 8:53 am
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