As the only US historian at my tiny university, I’m obligated to teach both halves of the survey as well as all sorts of courses that take me outside my areas of expertise. And lacking many of those, I spend much of my time in the classroom wondering if I’m not selling expired merchandise, interpretations or approaches that more accomplished professionals with better time management skills might have dismissed years if not decades ago.
That said, I’m relieved to report that at least where my treatment of the Revolutionary War is concerned, I manage to avoid these seven myths, described and debunked in nice detail by John Ferling. I come somewhat close to repeating two of the items on the list — I probably understate the possibility that Britain might have wom the war after 1778, and I probably overstate the turning-pointedness of Saratoga — but I think a jury of Ferlings would probably vote to acquit.
The Edge of the American West 
4 comments
January 8, 2010 at 5:38 pm
Sir Charles
Have you read “Almost a Miracle?” As an amateur, I found it really compelling. Curious what a pro makes of it.
January 9, 2010 at 12:03 am
washerdreyer
Thanks Charles, that sets up the question I want to ask nicely. I started reading The Glorious Cause. About 75 pages in, it seems like a recitation of data which can’t be bothered to try holding my interest. If I’m interested in learning about the period it covers, should I keep reading it anyway, switch to Almost a Miracle (which seems to have a somewhat narrower focus), or read some other thing/things entirely?
January 9, 2010 at 5:00 am
Sir Charles
wd,
“Almost a Miracle” is a very interesting and comprehensive recounting of the military aspects of the Revolutionary War, focusing heavily on Washington’s strengths and weaknesses as a military leader, without failing to cover the contributions of other military leaders. To me, the most interesting aspect of it was the discussion of the campaigns in the Southern U.S., which I did not really know that much about.
Ferling has a broader popular history of the period called “A Leap in the Dark,” which I’d alos hihgly recommend as a lay person.
January 10, 2010 at 9:48 am
TF Smith
One of the comments on the Smithsonian website made the point that these aren’t really “myths” but simply shadings of interpretation, including the point that Washington didn’t have to be a tactical genius, he just had to be better than Gage, and Howe, and Cornwallis – which he was.
The First American Army by Bruce Chadwick is a journalistic history of the Continental Army, but seems pretty well-sourced; worth reading, I think. Middlekauf is a much more challenging read, but worth it – he’s not McPherson, but does a solid job. Anything by Edmund S. Morgan is great, of course…
An question I have not seen answered is how the English/British decision-makers assesed the strategic situation in North America in terms of their experience in the French & Indian/Seven Years War; one would think the impact of friendlies in the colonies (in terms of supply lines, if nothing else) on the success or failure of British operations against New France would have been obvious, and the lack of such friendlies in 1775 would have been equally obvious.
Also potentially interesting would be what lessons the British military establishment took to North America based on their previous involvement in civil wars/insurrections against peers – the Second Jacobite rising in Scotland in the 1740s and the English Civil War/War of Three Kingdoms in 1639-1651…