First: I have to write some comments for a session at the Central APA. The paper I’m commenting on is by a much smarter guy, but I’m pretty sure he’s wrong. So this puts me in a weird position: I confidently predict I’ll make my objections and then he’ll respond in a smart and convincing way. So at some future moment I’ll believe that he’s right. But I don’t know the content of his reply, so I’m stuck with my current belief that he’s wrong. I’m reminded of al-Ghazali’s discussion of taqlid (more or less beliefs held out of uncritical emulation rather than reasonable enquiry) in Deliverance from Error: it seems that continued belief is incompatible with the recognition that your belief is of this sort. And yet reading this guy’s paper, I can’t but think that he’s not correct. Ah, the epistemology of everyday life. (Fine, I know about the al-Ghazali discussion only because Gideon Rosen talks about it. Damn, my Islamist cred is slipping away, isn’t it?)
Second: I got a great referee report in the mail today. Refs one and two wrote up careful, thoughtful comments. Referee number three said only: “Interesting. I don’t agree with all of it, but that’s philosophy for you.”
Indeed.
8 comments
October 28, 2008 at 11:59 am
Vance
So can you write, “This would be better if the author explicitly anticipated and addressed objections X, Y and Z, which will surely occur to more than one interlocutor?”
October 28, 2008 at 11:59 am
SomeCallMeTim
This is the O’Brien problem from 1984, isn’t it? “Every thought that I’ve had, he’s had, so my objections must be objections that he has overcome.” This comes up for me all the time.
I’m reminded of al-Ghazali’s discussion of taqlid
I think Raz al-Ghul also had something to say about this, but I can’t remember what.
October 28, 2008 at 12:05 pm
ari
It’s Rā’s al Ghūl, racist.
October 28, 2008 at 12:06 pm
Neddy Merrill
No, Vance, I’m going to say, “you love your thesis– but we love death!” and then chop his head off.
On a slightly more serious note, my comments will be lame because they follow the basic line, “this game you want to play? your opponents are not at all interested in playing it.” Or I’ll just stare at him wearily while shaking my head.
What’s really surprising is that they still let me post here.
October 28, 2008 at 1:38 pm
ben wolfson
It is possible, of course, that he is wrong, and that his response will convince you because he’s smarter than you, but not so smart that he actually attained the correct position.
Moreover, you won’t, in the future, believe he’s right. Instead, you’ll believe that he has countered your objection. Very different.
October 28, 2008 at 10:32 pm
bitchphd
“Interesting. I don’t agree with all of it, but that’s philosophy for you.”
Just say that. DUH.
October 29, 2008 at 11:30 am
Prof B
Don’t know what the etiquette is in philosophy, but at a conference in Vail over the weekend (international relations/security studies), a professor from my undergraduate days told me his smart philosophy for being a discussant/commenter on panels: First, do no harm.
In his estimation, the critical/negative stuff should be done privately, via written comments, so that you don’t sandbag the speaker. If you disagree or don’t understand, you can frame it “nicely,” but he dislikes the (in political science, anyway) graduate student trick of a head-fake and then some precocious and snotty observation about the non-random distribution of the paper’s variable or its failure to differentiate x with respect to y, etc. etc.
October 29, 2008 at 4:22 pm
matt w
This is pretty much the are you smarter than David Lewis and Timothy Williamson problem, isn’t it? Maybe combined with the Reflection Principle; rather than just saying “He’s smarter than me so I have some reason to believe what he says,” you’re thinking “He’s smarter than me so I’ll probably be rationally convinced by him in the future without which means that I really should believe it even now.” Though I’m perfectly happy to believe that Williamson is both smarter than me and wrong. Doesn’t necessarily mean I’m right.
Prof. B, the etiquette in philosophy is definitely not to save the critical/negative stuff for private comments. You’re supposed to disagree with something — there are exceptions sometimes, but disagreement is the norm. Partly because we’re usually disagreeing with what has gone before. (Also, at least at these APA things, the etiquette is to send your comments in advance, so nobody’s sandbagged. The sandbagging takes place in the Q & A. Others are free to disagree with my assertions about etiquette.)