The liberation of Paris in August 1944, featuring the column of Capitaine Raymond Dronne.
It was of course owing to the D-Day invasion and the rapid advance of the US and UK forces that the French got to liberate the French, but there was little wish in the moment of Notre Dame’s chimes ringing out to emphasize that.
Capitaine Dronne named his Jeep “Mort aux cons,” or “Death to idiots”; his commanding general asked, “Why do you want to kill everyone?”
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24 comments
November 29, 2011 at 12:51 pm
honzik
Great picture.
Is this sad story well-attested? http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7984436.stm
November 29, 2011 at 12:54 pm
eric
I hadn’t seen that before; thank you.
November 29, 2011 at 10:52 pm
JWL
German General von Choltitz, who surrendered Paris, was for decades lauded for his refusal to dynamite the bridges and other cultural monuments of the city as ordered by Hitler. He was commonly portrayed as an exemplar of the “decent” military professional of the Wermacht, one who upheld the strictures of civilized warfare (an oxymoron if there ever was one).
That myth was finally shattered with the publication of ‘Tapping Hitlers Generals’. The book is a compilation of transcripts of conversations held between German Generals captured during the war. They were recorded by the British at the plush estate/POW compound of Trent Park, located outside London, which had been lavishly furnished specifically to encourage loose talk. Ironically, when von Choltitz arrived in August of ’45, he immediately cautioned his fellow internees that they were likely being wiretapped– and then proceeded to sing like a canary. He freely admitted his participation in, and knowledge of, the mass murders common to the eastern front (from which he had been transferred to assume command in Paris). As the book amply demonstrates, the sonsofbitches all knew, and all countenanced to one degree or the other. Even so, many were deluded enough to hold the SS in no uncertain contempt, as though they were divorced in both deed and spirit from the heinous crimes committed by Himmler’s murderers.
All in all, a breezy, lighthearted summer read, perfect for the beach or poolside. 4 stars.
November 30, 2011 at 9:14 pm
TF Smith
French military and civilian dead during the war totalled more than 500,000, IIRC; I think the 2eme DB deserved to liberate Paris.
Worth remembering is that the FCNL government provided the manpower and the US the equipment for eight combat divisions for service in the MTO and ETO, beginning in 1943, under the Casablanca agreements, when the French 2nd and 3rd divisions deployed to Italy from North Africa.
By the end of 1944, French forces in action included the 1st, 2nd, and 5th armored divisions, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 9th infantry divisions, all organized along US lines and replacing, essentially, eight US divisions that presumably would have had to be diverted from the Pacific. Once in action in France and Germany in 1944-45, almost all of these divisions’ replacements were from metropolitan France.
Eight more divisions, one armored and seven infantry, were organized under a second agreement in 1944 from liberated manpower in metropolitan France by VE Day, and elements of four of those saw some action before the German surrender. There were also innumerable corps and army troops, and “non-program” units raised and equipped by the French with whatever was at hand, that served in rear areas – it is actually a pretty impressive feat of mobilization in wartime, considering the overall economic and political conditions in France and the French colonies in 1943-45.
The 1st Infantry and 2nd Armored were both strongly Gaullist; the other six raised as part of the 1943 agreement were essentially organized around cadre from the “armistice” army in French North and West Africa. The eight raised in 1944-45 were essentially FFI irregulars, veterans, and conscripts.
Bonne chance
December 1, 2011 at 7:19 pm
Tropfort
The word “con” does mean “idiot”, in a way, but aren’t you being a bit too delicate here?
December 1, 2011 at 7:20 pm
eric
I thought about that, but I figured I’d follow Beevor’s lead.
December 2, 2011 at 2:21 am
Dave
Everything TF Smith says is of course true, as is the fact that a) most of the manpower was African [North- and Sub-Saharan-], b) this was carefully hidden in the arrangements for the liberation of Paris, and c) the survivors were treated like shit by the French govt for many years afterwards. Documented [not without a certain parti pris] in this notable recent film:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Days_of_Glory_%282006_film%29
December 2, 2011 at 10:22 am
TF Smith
Dave –
True enough, but also true is that:
A) Africa was where the manpower – mostly volunteer, albeit from an economy where choices were limited – was in 1942-43;
B) Not exactly surprising, given the politics (inter-allied and internal to France) of the time; bringing French metropolitan manpower that could be conscripted into the Allied manpower pool and bringing the various factions of French resistance (Gaullist, ex-Armistice, FFI, etc.) was more important in 1944 than keeping the French colonial/imperial populations engaged, so giving the 2nd DB (and all that entailed) the “Paris” honor was basic common sense as a morale booster; and
C) “Tommy this and Tommy that” works just as well for “Ahmed this and Ahmed that” but the last line in the poem is prophetic; certainly more than a few colonial soldiers, from Ben Bella to Manekshaw, “saw” exactly what was what, and acted accordingly postwar.
Also worth thinking about when it comes to the 2nd DB (as opposed to any of the other “1943″ divisions) was that whichever French division went to the UK to participate with the AEF in NW Europe was going to serve in a mobile campaign with the 12th (US) Army Group, so including a division that was essentially interchangeable with a US division made sense, from a logistical and operational point of view – so the obvious choice would be one of the three French armored divisions, and of the three, the 2nd had been in existence (and thus had a stronger cadre) the longest and was also the only “Gaullist” armored division.
Were the reasoning race-based? Undoubtedly, but there were also very valid operational reasons for the 2nd DB to get the nod.
Best,
December 2, 2011 at 11:06 am
TF Smith
Interesting primary source on Dronne and his contemporaries in 1943:
http://books.google.com/books?id=bcWsgYoMCagC&pg=PT190&lpg=PT190&dq=corps+franc+d'afrique&source=bl&ots=a9rXf9QzDe&sig=JgM-BIz_iLKqK7HRarhXJJKRKUk&hl=en&ei=khHZTvb8LvHXiAK7gIGwCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAzgK#v=onepage&q=corps%20franc%20d'afrique&f=false
December 2, 2011 at 12:19 pm
dave
And the story in the first comment? The 2e DB was 25% African, UNTIL they decided to use it in Normandy… You seem to be trying to excuse something which is, prima facie, inexcusable. But perhaps you are not.
December 2, 2011 at 3:39 pm
TF Smith
Actually, the BBC story says, quoting Walter Bedell Smith, the the 2nd DB was “one fourth native” which given the context and times, could mean almost anything – “native” what? North Africans? Lebanese and Syrians? West Africans? Somali and Madgascarene? Franco-Indian? West Indian? Polynesian? All of the above?
I don’t know, and you don’t either – certainly not from the information included in the 2009 BBC story.
It is completely unclear what “native” meant in the statement from Smith, or what the ethnic makeup of the 2nd DB was in 1943-44, when the division was sent from North Africa to the UK. I checked Vigneras; nothing in the Green Book speaks to this issue. Maybe there is a better source somewhere; presumably in French, but it would be nice to see it.
And seriously, you really see this decision as inexcusable, in the scheme of things in WW II?
It seems perfectly execusable in terms of using a force that would A) fit the TO&E of a US army organized for mobile warfare; and B) include troops who reflected the population of metropolitan France to liberate their own capital; and thus C) assist in providing for the maximum use of French manpower and promoting political and military unity in metropolitan France in 1944-45, for D) the purpose of defeating Germany in the west as rapidly as possible.
The BBC story strongly suggests that simple racial prejudice by American commanders was behind this, although if so, one wonders why a more definitive quote was not included to make such a motivation clear, especially given that such reasoning would have to discount the record of the FEC in Italy in 1943-44 – which would be difficult to ignore by SHAEF, given the decision to move the FEC from the 15th Army Group to the 6th for ANVIL/DRAGOON was the subject of significant discussion in this period.
And again, especially as there were undoubted operationally valid reasons to select the 2nd DB, as opposed to any of the French infantry divisions or either of the other two French armored divisions, it seems a leap too far to subscribe the selection of the 2nd DB to simple racism; French political and Allied operational realities seem rather more likely.
As a (somewhat) related example, here is a quote from Smith’s memo to Eisenhower regarding using African-American volunteers from Army service units as infantry replacements in 1944-45:
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/11-4/chapter22.htm
Smith may have been a flaming rascist, he may not have (he was from Indianapolis; not exactly a son of the south) but he was also senstive to the realities of domestic politics in the US when it came to racial issues; I don’t think it is endorsing racism to suggest he was not equally aware of the realities of domestic politics in France with regards to similar issues.
Beyond that, I think this statement in the BBC story – “given the fact that Britain did not segregate its forces” – suggests the original source material bears some scrutiny.
One can define segregation in many ways, but by any reading, every Indian Army infantry, armored, or artillery battalion recruited in India was segregated, as were the forces raised in British imperial territories in West Africa and East Africa, and I am unaware of a significant “non-white” percentage of manpower within the British army, navy, or air force in WW II, as opposed to the imperial and colonial armies – i.e, the Indian Army, West African Frontier Force, etc.
Best,
December 2, 2011 at 5:06 pm
silbey
The point, I think, is not merely that the Americans requested the 2nd, but that–according to the article–also requested that the 25% non-metropolitan troops be taken out and replaced by white troops:
“So, Allied Command insisted that all black soldiers be taken out and replaced by white ones from other units.”
And I’m not sure it changes the criticism particularly if it’s the innate racism of the officers or a simple reaction to domestic politics.
I do agree however that lauding Britain’s armed forces as desegregated would have made Gandhi, among others, spit out his drink.
December 2, 2011 at 9:05 pm
TF Smith
FWIW, Vigneras – closest thing I have to a primary source – says the FCNL (a wartime coalition government is there ever was one) selected the 2nd DB.
Which is not really surprising, given that it was the most “Gaullist” of the three armored divisions, Leclerc was well respected as a commander, and that the French Army was the most politicized of the Western allies by a long shot…
I also don’t see that Bedell Smith’s use, as quoted, of the word “native” equates to sub-Saharan African; I’d like to see the entire document, and what else surrounded it – including the material from Morgan.
And I don’t see it as especially sinful, given the realities of French politics in 1943-45; whose example is more likely to appeal to the military age manpower of France in 1944-45, that of the average soldier in the 2nd DB or that of the average soldier in the 9th DIC?
Seems like rational decision-making in coalition warfare, to be realistic about it.
I agree with you that one of the few things that Gandhi, Nehru, Jinnah, Manekshaw, Cariappa, and the Khan brothers would have found themselves in agreement about in 1944 would be the “desegregated” status of the Indian Army…
Best,
December 3, 2011 at 7:36 am
silbey
TF, I’m not sure why you’re emphasizing sub-Saharan Africans? Bedell-Smith’s quote is simply about having white soldiers; he surely would have lumped French Arabic soldiers and those from sub-Sahara together.
December 3, 2011 at 9:40 am
TF Smith
I don’t know enough about Bedell Smith to make that judgment, actually; certainly not based on the information included in the BBC article. Given his service with AFHQ in Algiers, he may have had a very nuanced perspective on the question, actually – more so than Ned Almond, as one example.
Anyone know DKR Crosswell? He is at Columbus State in Georgia, and the author of what appears to be the most comprehensive recent biography of Bedell Smith. See:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67495/dkr-crosswell-robert-coram-gen-hugh-sheltonronald-levinsonmalcol/beetle-the-life-of-general-walter-bedell-smith-a
I sent him a note, but he won’t know me from Adam.
Best,
December 3, 2011 at 10:20 am
dave
The results of a couple of minutes googling about the UK’s black servicemen in 1939-45:
http://www.caribbeanaircrew-ww2.com/
http://www.culture24.org.uk/history+%26+heritage/war+%26+conflict/world+war+two/art32051
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8344170.stm
Segregated? Hmm, not really.
Meanwhile, whatever else you may say about the noble quest for Indian independence, it remains a fact that the British Indian Army in WW2 was 2.5 million strong, and represented the largest all-volunteer military force in recorded history.
And TF, what you say is still a tissue of speculation, whereas the BBC report at least had the decency to directly quote a source concerned with making the 2e DB “one hundred percent white”.
December 3, 2011 at 11:34 am
TF Smith
Dave –
The information about African-descent aircrew in the RAF is interesting, both for its contrast to the segregated USAAF and for the apparent higher status of West Indians, vis a vis West and East Africans (much less Africans recruited in the British High Commission territories in southern Africa, where the Union’s politics brought some unique pressures to bear, obviously).
That being said, the British Army (ie, the regulars, territorials, and hostilities only personnel recruited in the UK) and the RN were very diffferent institutions than the RAF. The link regarding “colored” personnel in British naval service is talking about the colonial navies, i.e., the Indian Navy, RNVR in Burma, etc. These are different organizations than the RN. Something scholarly on the “color bar” “color line” or however ones wishes to describe it would be helpful.
Beyond that, the IA was an all-volunteer force (albeit with the same economic factors at work in recruitment as the French colonial armies) but it was no more integrated at the battalion level than the US Army was – again, the IA and the West African and East African colonial forces were segregated by race. The literature on the differences between KCOs, VCOs, and “native” officers in the Indian Army is huge, and a prime element of subaltern studies in South Asia, for one example.
Note that the West African and East African colonies were British-controlled governments; no references to the South Africans, etc.
Also note that the “white” quotes in the BBC article are sourced to both Walter Bedell Smith (USA) and Frederick Morgan (UK), with very little context – there are no quotes from the French, for example, who would seem to bring a perspective worth considering. Again, there is no explanation of what “white” refers to in the context of 1943 for either Smith, Morgan, or the French (North Africans are certainly not “black” any more than Syrians and Lebanese are) and yet the BBC author describes these statements as racist.
Are they? I think that may be assuming facts not in evidence.
There’s also a larger point – the Allies (including the FCNL) were planning on using huge amounts of liberated French manpower to sustain the French army replacement system, to expand the French field army, and to support and serve the American, British, Canadian, Polish, etc armies in NW Europe in 1944-45 – is acknowledging the reality that liberating the French capital with as “French” a force as possible would undeniably benefit the Allied cause any less a valid interpretation than simply suggesting Smith, Morgan, et al were white supremacists?
Perhaps they were, but I don’t see it, based on the sources presented.
Best,
December 3, 2011 at 11:41 am
Dan Crosswell
Branding Smith as a racist amounts to shooting the messenger. Smith’s connection with the “race issue” dated back to May 1940. The following is an extract from my biography of Smith:
“In May 1940 Congress passed selective service legislation, permitting the expansion of the army to its Protective Mobilization Plan quota of 750,000 men and 250,000 replacements. Under the terms of the Selective Service Act of 1940, African Americans would constitute 10 percent of the draftees—the proportion of blacks in the national population. [In June 1940 African Americans composed a scant 1.5 percent of the enlisted strength of the regular army. Another 3,000 served in National Guard units.] The War Department geared up for the inevitable political pressure to integrate the army. Marshall assigned Smith the unenviable job of front man in defense of the Jim Crow Army.” [for more complete coverage, see pp. 217-220]
Smith acted as assistant secretary to Marshall and held the rank of major. It fell to him to write what became War Department policy. In transitioning from “Dr. New Deal” to “Dr. Win-the-War,” Roosevelt veered to the right to shore up bipartisan and “solid South” support in his own party. At the same time, civil rights leaders—including A. Philip Randolph, head of the March on Washington movement [and Eleanor Roosevelt]—pressured Roosevelt to employ executive powers to end racial segregation in the armed forces as an important step in bringing down Plessy v. Ferguson. Other than a couple palliative appointments, Roosevelt refused to budge. Major Smith’s memorandum crossed Marshall’s desk and went to the White House. Effectively, Smith’s memo set policy for the duration of the war.
Again from the biography,
“Smith never discussed his views on politics—he probably never voted—or race relations. On the surface, evidence suggests he defended the Jim Crow Army. He had blocked the deployment of West African troops in Tunisia and insisted that the French division sent to England for Overlord consisted of all-white troops. The spectacle of nonwhite combat troops deployed in England [or Tunisia] could only raise embarrassing questions about the segregationist policies confining African Americans to rear-area support roles and exacerbate already tense relations between the races in the U.S. Army. He also had a proprietary interest in the race policy, since he had played a key role in framing it. Clearly, he acted in defense of Marshall [and in the case of Lee’s call for African American volunteers during the Bulge crisis, Eisenhower].” [see pp. 840-3]
December 3, 2011 at 11:55 am
silbey
Segregated? Hmm, not really.
The problem with that remark (and with the original framing of the BBC article) is that the American practice of segregation doesn’t fit entirely with what the British did, and vice versa. But holding up what the British did as superior (as the BBC article does) is also foolish. The British certainly organized their army in ways that reflected racial bias (eg the white colonies were able to provide their own officers; the armies of the non-white colonies largely had white British officers). This is not to defend the American army–it was as appallingly racist as we would believe–but the air of sniffy British superiority of the BBC article is just silly.
I note that the best defense that we can mount of Bedell-Smith is that he was only as racist as the times. That was pretty racist.
(Thanks for the comment, Dan. Always good to have the expert word on a subject show up in the comments! Dan’s book can be found here and makes a lovely gift for all occasions.)
December 3, 2011 at 1:05 pm
TF Smith
Thank you, Dr. Crosswell – in your research, did you come across any more detail in terms of the discussion about the choice of the French division to partcipate in OVERLORD, beyond what has been touched upon here? If so, am I totally off in suggesting there could have been operational and both French and inter-allied internal political reasons to chose the 2nd DB? I’d appreciate it.
Silbey – good point; which Commonwealth & Empire territories would you describe as “white colonies” by 1939? The dominions (except Newfoundland) all had responsible government, so what’s left with a majority “white” population – Newfoundland is one, obviously – others – Bermuda? Gibraltar? Malta? Cyprus? Palestine?
Best,
December 4, 2011 at 8:58 am
chris y
The American High command had a track record of interfering in other countries’ race relations during WWII. Many Brits are familiar with the story of Nat Bookbinder, who ran a dance club in north west England in which he not merely welcomed servicemen of all races but made no objection to them dancing with white girls. The British authorities very likely disapproved of this, but they regarded it as none of their business. It was the Americans who insisted that they force him to exclude black GIs from his club and, when he refused to do so, to remove Bookbinder to war work so that he could no longer manage the club and the business folded. This particular story is wearily consistent with their insistence on imposing Jim Crow on their allies whether they liked it or not.
Bookbinders’ story is better known these days than it might be because his niece, the singer Elkie Brooks (Elaine Bookbinder), was famous for fifteen minutes twenty years ago, so that it was relayed to another generation.
December 4, 2011 at 8:00 pm
TF Smith
Nevil Shute had a novel that turned on – among other plot points – an African-American GI who tried to commit suicide after being falsely accused of assault on an English girl; the plot develops, they marry, and live HEA in postwar Britain.
Jim Crow, as Dr. Lee wrote in 1952 (linked above) was a tragic reality for the US in the 1940s, including in the AUS – and absent a decision by FDR to force the issue in the fall of 1940, when mobilization began, (with whatever impact that would have had on domestic US politics and, obvously, the 1942 mid-terms) I don’t believe the Army was in a position to have done much more than what was done in 1940-45.
The impact of a desegregated military via executive order in 1940 could be an interesting one for the FDR scholars here, of course – my guess it would have been a challenge, on multiple levels, but that’s just me.
So, was a Jim Crow army in 1940-45 brutal and racist? Yes.
Was Jim Crow a realistic, even pragmatic, policy in 1940-45, given the underlying realities of American society?
Presumably, since fairly sharp and generally liberal individuals ranging from FDR on down accepted it, in spite of the obvious political weapon it handed the Axis.
The African-American population of the US in 1940 was roughly 10 percent, and the percentage of AA males of military age was the same. The percentage of racist non-African American males was – presumably – higher, sadly enough.
Best,
December 4, 2011 at 8:26 pm
silbey
I don’t think anyone’s particularly disputing that, TF, but that doesn’t mean we can’t (or shouldn’t) be condemnatory of both the Army and American society. “Just about as racist as the rest of society” is a valid explanation, not a valid excuse.
(Note also that much the same Army actually actively resisted integration in 1947: http://edgeofthewest.wordpress.com/2009/08/17/integrations-under-fire/ )
December 4, 2011 at 10:06 pm
TF Smith
Kind of presentist, ain’t it?
There’s an potential counter-factual, I guess, in what would the outcome have been if FDR had ordered desegregation in 1940…or even in 1933.
Interesting that the CCC started out integrated, and became segregated over time, certainly in the south.
http://newdeal.feri.org/aaccc/index.htm
Best,