In the second ten days of January 1900, the news from China that reached New York was all of matters military and diplomatic. There was no further mention of the Boxers and, in fact, mentions of China occupied themselves almost entirely with the aggressive (if not thuggish) maneuverings of the great powers and China’s shifting ability to resist them. China was not so much being conquered as it was being organized by the western powers, if organized by violence, by intimidation, and by edict. Or, at least, that’s the way the New York Times presented it.
China—to use a technical term—was not even an other. It was a bare playing field on which others warred in sporting matches that went back and forth but were never quite ended.

Thus the Times declared, on January 17, 1900, that “any power which chooses may, according to our contention, maltreat the Chinese as much as it choose and carve up their inheritance to suit itself. All that we ask is that we shall hereafter be permitted to trade there, as now, on the footing of the most favored nations, which is to say, on the same footing as the conquering and partitioning power.” A conquered part of China would simply be a “certain tract” which the European power had the “right to police at its own expense.” In that sense, China seemed property to be mortgaged and owned and tended. The Chinese themselves were not civilized and the model for dealing with them was the British one: “It has paid her to subdue savages in quest of new markets.”
At the same time, China existed as an international actor. The Empress Dowager, the Times gravely noted, had published a “secret decree…in which she speaks of the danger which threatens the empire from foreign aggression” with “‘tiger-like voracity.’” This “stiffening of China’s backbone” could not, for the Times be native to the Chinese. Instead, the paper speculated that the Japanese had reached an “understanding” with the Empress that led to her defiance, a speculation reinforced by another article which pointed out that the Japanese were offering to establish a military academy in Beijing staffed with Japanese instructors to educate Chinese officers.
And yet the Chinese still existed and appeared in the pages of the paper. On 17 January 1900, the Times wrote of Li Hung Chang (Li Hongzhang), a Chinese statesman already well known in the west.
The article was particularly interesting because it was written from the perspective of Li, himself. He had been “withdrawn from the Tsung Li Yamen [Chinese group charged with relations with the foreign powers] in 1898 at the demand of Great Britain but he was not degraded.” He was a “favorite” of the Dowager Empress and was thus given a range of jobs, including a survey of the Yellow River, a “very trying tour” the paper wrote. Following that, the Empress sent him to Canton to be “Viceroy of the Kwantung and Kwangse Provinces.” The tone of the article continued in this personal vein: as Viceroy, “Li has on his hand the vexatious situation due to the aggression of the French…Li Hung Chang, therefore, steps into a next upholstered with bayonets.”
The article finishes with this contemplative, almost familial line: “The Canton Viceroyalty is one of the most lucrative in China, but to contend successful with the Chinese factions, with his enemies at Peking, and with the French will puzzle the old statesman.” The article was remarkable in focusing on a single Chinese, and focusing with great intimacy. It is the foreigners here who were the anonymous others, and Li Hung Chang who was the familiar character. It was the goals, worries, and challenges of Li that dominated the story to the exclusion of all else. A hint of why came in the second paragraph, where the article mentioned that Li was accompanied in his work by “N.J. Pettrick, formerly United States Vice Consul at Tientsin, [Li's] private secretary.” My conclusion is—probably obviously—that Pettrick was either the source or author of the article, and so represented Li’s viewpoints back to the west. In a strange way, thus, China existed as property and playground, as other, and as a real, live person who could be vexed or puzzled or degraded.


15 comments
January 23, 2009 at 1:17 pm
Vance
Striking that the “open door” op-ed uses “we” so casually. As with the other article, suggests an identity of the paper’s viewpoint with that of one of the article’s subjects.
January 23, 2009 at 2:06 pm
Jay C
Yes, silbey: who, exactly is the “we” in the (first) linked NYT piece (Jan. 17, 1900)? The Times facsimile doesn’t indicate, but this looks far more like a conventional “editorial” – in which case the “we”, one presumes, is the editorial voice of the paper itself – than what we might term an “Op-Ed” today.
Vance is right, though: these pieces have the distinct undertone of assuming a sort of collective agreement as to the wisdom and correctness of the China policy under discussion – the “we”, IMO anyway, can be read as including the entire country and/or the US Government, judging by their approval of “Mr. HAY’s” (presumably this guy ) policies.
Of course, that said policy translates, basically as “we don’t care what anyone does to China or the Chinese as long as we (US interests) can keep on making money there” seems to go unremarked-upon.
January 23, 2009 at 2:15 pm
silbey
I’m pretty sure it’s an editorial, though (interestingly) the Times archive doesn’t make that clear in any way. So I think the ‘we’ is the Times itself. You’re right about the sense of agreement.
January 23, 2009 at 2:31 pm
ekogan
How long did it take for dispatches from China to NYC?
How did they get there?
Wikipedia shows telegraph lines going to Peking and Shanghai, so one would expect near real-time communication, but the previous entry said that a missionary’s murder which occurred on Dec 3 was only report on Jan. 5 in the NYT.
January 23, 2009 at 2:41 pm
ekogan
Is the cartoon in this post from a French source?
“Chine” and the fact that France is the only attractive character in the cartoon seem to indicate so.
Two things are interesting about it: US isn’t even pictured as a player in China and France is shown as a secondary power without a seat at the table. Yet both nations sent ~ 3000 troops to suppress Boxers.
January 23, 2009 at 2:51 pm
ekogan
It’s also interesting how the Chinese are considered inferior, while Japan is an equal power with a seat at the table. Even before Japan demonstrated its modern military by spanking China, the Brits were holding Japanese exhibitions and singing the Mikado, so the relative respect Japan got from Westeners can’t be explained simply by their military might.
January 23, 2009 at 5:03 pm
Jay C
ekogan:
It’s a complex subject, but IIRC, Japan’s relative “respect” wrt being considered a regional Power wasn’t just a function of military development. In the Meiji Era (from 1868) the Japanese dealt with Western (European and US) powers more-or-less as equals – or at least as trading partners- having (definitely unlike China) a compact, homogeneous country with a strong central government dedicated to modernization and development. As opposed to China, which basically just wanted to outside world to go away.
The military buildup didn’t hurt, though: in early 1900, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 would have been a recent memory: the performance of Japanese forces in that conflict greatly impressed Western onlookers. As did their contributions in the Boxer Rebellion. And, looking ahead, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5: which impressed everybody.
January 23, 2009 at 9:17 pm
Jonathan Dresner
In the Meiji Era (from 1868) the Japanese dealt with Western (European and US) powers more-or-less as equals
No. Japan wanted to be treated like an equal, and Japan was willing to engage with the Western-style international system, but it wasn’t until the first major round of Westernizing reforms were complete (and Japan began pushing Korea and China around like a Western power) in the 1880s that Japan even began to get traction on being treated like an equal. The UK was the first country to establish equal-status treaties with Japan, to surrender the privileges of the “unequal treaty” system, after Japan had established a constitutional monarchy, revised the civil and criminal codes and beaten China in the Sino-Japanese war.
China, which basically just wanted to outside world to go away.
There’s a significant modernizing tradition in China as well, from the 1860s on, as well as a fair degree of xenophobia and undeserved cultural pride. Cixi, the dowager empress, and her eunuch servitors, should not be mistaken for “China.”
January 24, 2009 at 7:22 am
silbey
How long did it take for dispatches from China to NYC?
In absolute physical terms, they got there very quickly. The telegraph lines by 1900 spanned the globe and could pass news within hours. But that depended on how critical the news was viewed. The missionary’s murder had taken several weeks to percolate out of China, and it wasn’t seen as particularly urgent (thus the single paragraph story) so it didn’t make it to NY all that quickly.
Is the cartoon in this post from a French source?
It is a French cartoon.
The military buildup didn’t hurt, though: in early 1900, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 would have been a recent memory: the performance of Japanese forces in that conflict greatly impressed Western onlookers. As did their contributions in the Boxer Rebellion. And, looking ahead, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5: which impressed everybody.
Good summary. It’s interesting to note that the British officers during the Boxer Rebellion *loved* the Japanese. They thought them terribly well disciplined and fierce (the Japanese kept mounting suicidal frontal assaults on the Chinese defenses), whereas the Russians, French, and Americans were a bit scruffy (one American unit showed up for inspection after the capture of Beijing and every soldier had some piece of Chinese clothing on, in place of their uniforms. The American officer who remembered this was quite unconcerned about the whole thing.)
There’s a significant modernizing tradition in China as well, from the 1860s on, as well as a fair degree of xenophobia and undeserved cultural pride. Cixi, the dowager empress, and her eunuch servitors, should not be mistaken for “China.”
Jonathan’s right to point out the significant reformist tradition. 1900 comes only two years after the 100 days reform, which was the Emperor’s attempt to wrest control of power from the Dowager and reform the Chinese system. He failed, but the impulse was still there.
(Favorite moment of that period. The Dowager Empress locks up the Emperor and sends out an imperial announcement about how sick he is and how close to death and isn’t it awful, setting up a “death” for him. The regional governors get together and write back a note saying how terrible it would be if the Emperor died and how really quite upset they would be by that. The Dowager Empress kept the Emperor alive.)
January 24, 2009 at 4:31 pm
Jonathan Dresner
How long did it take for dispatches from China to NYC?
In absolute physical terms, they got there very quickly. The telegraph lines by 1900 spanned the globe and could pass news within hours.
Also, the Boxers cut telegraph lines when they could: there were periods when Beijing was quite cut off from this kind of immediate communication, so the dispatches get pretty sporadic. Also, there’s the question of information quality: a lot of rumor and error got sent at the speed of Morse….
January 24, 2009 at 4:34 pm
silbey
Also, the Boxers cut telegraph lines when they could: there were periods when Beijing was quite cut off from this kind of immediate communication, so the dispatches get pretty sporadic. Also, there’s the question of information quality: a lot of rumor and error got sent at the speed of Morse….
Hey! Stop giving away the good stuff!
January 24, 2009 at 5:32 pm
Jonathan Dresner
Sorry!
In my defense, nobody but us has read this thread in over 24 hours….
January 24, 2009 at 6:10 pm
JPool
I have, but then I was at work today.
Question: This is probably something I should know, but as an Africanist what comes most to mind in reading the first part of your account is the 1884 Berlin Conference. By 1900 the hard work of conquest of African territories was still on-going (though carried out primarily by African soldiers), the Anglo-French contest only recently resolved, and the difficulties and costs of actual administration starting to become apparent. How much were these seemingly quite parallel set of dynamics in the minds of those nations considering imperial expansion into China?
January 25, 2009 at 8:28 am
silbey
How much were these seemingly quite parallel set of dynamics in the minds of those nations considering imperial expansion into China?
They were there, to a certain extent. China was seen as too large to be conquered effectively by a lot of the powers. Having said that, the late 1890s saw something referred to as the “Scramble for Concessions” in which the imperial powers raced each other to get the most from the Chinese government. So it was business as usual to a large degree.
January 26, 2009 at 3:56 am
ajay
It’s interesting to note that the British officers during the Boxer Rebellion *loved* the Japanese. They thought them terribly well disciplined and fierce
An opinion which lasted for the next forty years – right up to 1943 the British army regarded the Japanese as superior, man for man, to themselves. It was one of Slim’s first objectives to reverse this belief among his troops.
I wonder how much of this was due to the flattering effect of the Japanese modelling modern Japan on Britain – in terms of things like clothing and fleets?